Although not the reply, I’d prefer to put some gentle on whether or not nodes ought to or shouldn’t be rewarded for validation:
-
utilizing a lightweight node pockets places the pockets itself at (restricted) threat moderately than the entire community. For instance even when all full nodes are malicious, customers can resort to working their very own full-nodes (there are much less doubtless fork situations although). Customers are answerable for safety of their gentle wallets in the identical approach they answerable for safety of their non-public keys.
-
The community can survive and maintain being decentralized (and include legitimate information) so long as there is no such thing as a monopoly on mining and at the least one full copy of block-chain(s) exists (miners or at the least mining swimming pools often have full copy).
-
SPV (easy fee verification) is strong to assaults geared toward stealing funds immediately from pockets in the event you comply with n-confirmation rule. Gentle wallets are much less sturdy to eclipse assaults, 1-confirmation assaults (full node can cover new transactions and longest chains from customers) and possibly some extra unique varieties.
-
there are non-monetary incentives: https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Clearing_Up_Misconceptions_About_Full_Nodes#Fantasy:_There_is_no_incentive_to_run_nodes_so_the_network_relies_on_altruism
P. S. with that stated whereas I’m not a giant fan of PoS – utilizing simplified overlay model of PoS (operator/stakeholder locks funds conditioned by itself “good conduct”) mixed with direct rewards as a secondary safety measure to extend availability, stop sybil-attacks and de-incentivize full nodes from dishonest might work and stimulate working extra full nodes.
Though because it talked about in different solutions – proving that the node is full is tough to not possible, so it will solely assure that one node doesn’t fake to be a bunch of nodes and it might additionally give mechanisms for penalizing malicious nodes (stop them from censorship for instance). The node could be rewarded solely for broadcasting transactions (and penalized for not doing so), they might not be rewarded for different light-node to full-node interactions (like requesting a historical past and many others).
Such hypothetical mechanism wouldn’t require modifications to bitcoin consensus or current protocols, it will solely require change of sunshine pockets’s signing logic (the customers pockets would add extra “full node reward output” in transaction) and possibly some overlay protocols to penalize censorship and unavailability (it must be overlay as a result of bitcoin Script isn’t virtually highly effective sufficient to examine proofs inside contracts).
Nonetheless, once more because it was talked about, retailers and pockets suppliers will not be monopolized and naturally plentiful (because of competitors) so introducing extra full-node charges for one of these safety could also be a bit of bit an excessive amount of, however who is aware of :).
Notice: In concept, PoS as secondary verifier would additionally enhance security of 1-confirmation transactions as was argued in earliest (earlier than Eth and others have been even conceived) btc-related discussions involving @QuantumMechanic, however in apply stakeholder’s “approval” is incompatible with PoW (stakeholder/SPO has no approach of realizing if miners would proceed constructing on high of block stakeholder/SPO selected). So it might solely be relevant to stop Sybil assaults, penalize censorship and improve availability.